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I. INTRODUCTION
Inquiry into the relative merits and legal basis of fixed minimum com-
mission rates steadily continues before the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission (SEC).' At stake is at least a substantial portion of the $1,200,000-
000 paid annually to members of the New York Stock Exchange
(NYSE) by the investing public for the privilege of trading in issues
listed on the "Big Board."2 In addition, it is asserted that the minimum
commission rate structure is "to a large extent" responsible for no less
than the nation's economic development, as well as the stability, efficiency,
liquidity, depth and existence of the world's leading stock exchange.3
However, a contrary view is urged by the Department of Justice which
contends that the elimination of minimum rate structures will result in
* Member of the Florida Bar; Assistant Dade County Attorney.
1. Proceedings were initiated by the SEC, Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Release
No. 8239 (Jan. 26, 1968). Subsequent events are detailed in the following sources: Note,
The application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 10 WM. & MARY L. REV.
136, 163-68 (1968); Response of the United States Department of Justice to S.E.C.
Release No. 34-8791. File No. 4-144, CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. f1 77,810 (current ed.)
(summary of comments) [hereinafter cited as Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice].
2. The quoted dollar amount of NYSE commissions appears in Kaplan v. Lehman
Bros., 389 U.S. 954, 955 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
The Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 71 notes that "transactions on the New York
markets alone [results in] well over $2 billion in brokerage commissions annually." When
the treble damage aspect of antitrust actions is applied to this already substantial amount,
the result is spectacular, as evidenced by a $3 billion class action suit which has recently
been filed against the "Big Board" and other major exchanges and brokerage houses
attacking the minimum commission structure. See Wall Street J., Oct. 6, 1970, at 3, col. 2.
3. Memorandum on behalf of New York Stock Exchange, presented at S.E.C. hear-
ing In re Commission Rate Structure of Registered National Securities Exchanges, No.
4-144 (S.E.C. Aug. 1968); statement of the American Stock Exchange submitted to the
Securities and Exchange Commission In re Commission Rate Structure of Registered
National Securities Exchanges, No. 4-144, C.C.H. FED. SEC. L. REP. 1 77,728 (current ed.)
(summary of comments) [hereinafter cited as Statement of the Amex].
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"healthy competition"4 which "is likely to provide substantial benefits
by lowering the ultimate cost to the investor, by eliminating detrimental
practices associated with the noncompetitive rate structure, and by im-
proving the quality of services to investors." 5
The substantive economic merits of exchange minimum commis-
sion rates, as opposed to a competitive rate structure, raise complex
analytical problems which have resulted in the inevitable split in expert
opinion.' The various analyses and conclusions on the issue have been
submitted to the SEC in both testimonial presentation and written form,
but no decision has been announced by that agency as of this writing.
This article is not an attempt to decide the issue presently before
the SEC. The substantive and economic merits of minimum commission
rates have been extensively and forcefully presented by a number of in-
terested and disinterested parties invited to participate in the hearings.
Instead, emphasis will be placed on the relatively unarticulated jurisdic-
tional and procedural issues. These issues, which are only of collateral
significance in the SEC proceedings, usually become more sharply fo-
cused in litigation and are generally discussed in terms of exemptions
from antitrust law coverage or under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
A number of concepts are involved in addition to the two just mentioned.
Included among these are: judicial review of administrative action;
supersession of judicial remedies by exclusive administrative remedies;
and exhausting of administrative remedies. The unfortunate failure of
the courts to recognize both the characteristics and the proper applica-
tion of these concepts has resulted in "essentially wasteful, time-consum-
ing and costly" jurisdictional disputes.7
Before entering into a discussion of these procedural pitfalls, a few
words should be said regarding the underlying substantive issues. In the
context of the structure of brokerage commissions, the fundamental issue
is the relationship between the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,1 and the
antitrust laws,9 which are designed to ensure that competitive forces in
the free market price goods for the maximum efficiency in resource al-
location. More precisely, "what is the impact of the regulatory law upon
the preexisting judicial sphere of antitrust influence? Are the antitrust
4. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 70. "Competition" is rarely permitted to
stand on its own merits: it is either "healthy" or "destructive" depending upon its use
by the Justice Department or members of the securities industry respectively. Presumably,
both refer to the same meaning of the word regardless of euphemism or epithet.
5. Id.
6. Compare Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 43-199 with NYSE Economic Brief
and Statement of the Amex supra note 3.
7. McGovern, Antitrust Exemptions for Regulated Industries, 20 FED. B.J. 10, 11
(1960) [hereinafter cited as McGovern]. See Note, Antitrust and the Stock Exchange:
Minimum Commission or Free Competition?, 18 STAN. L. REv. 213, 214 n.10 (1965)
[hereinafter cited as Antitrust].
8. 48 Stat. 88 (1934), as amended 15 U.S.C. §1 78(a)-(hh-1) (1967).
9. The relevant antitrust statute is the Sherman Act, 26 Stat. 209 (1890), as amended
15 U.S.C. § 1 et seq. (1964).
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prohibitions, and the jurisdiction of the courts to enforce them, un-
touched, supplemented, or supplanted by regulation?"'1 "The funda-
mental difficulty is that the courts continue to emphasize the social un-
desirability of acts claimed to have anticompetitive consequences, while
the regulatory agencies preside over areas where the social undesirability
of unrestrained competition is assumed." '11
As noted above, the SEC is now scrutinizing the assumption that a
competitive commission rate structure is socially undesirable. The im-
portance of the issue, as evidenced by the lively participation of the
interested parties-particularly the NYSE and the Justice Department
-suggests that regardless of the SEC determination court action is likely
to follow. Such a case would present before the court the broad range of
procedural and jurisdictional problems listed above, including "basic
principles of antitrust law not previously decided by [the Supreme]
Court, and, consequently ...not controlled by precedent." 2 It is in
anticipation of such litigation and the concomitant procedural and juris-
dictional issues that this article is written. The author's purpose will be
to analyze these procedural and jurisdictional problems and thus provide
prospective litigants with information which may help them avoid being
"chased from judicial pillar to administrative post, and back again."'"
This analysis has two branches: first, the possibility of a Congres-
sional antitrust exemption for the fixed minimum commission price
structure; second, the roles of the SEC, the NYSE, and the courts with
regard to the regulation of the securities industry in the area of minimum
commission rates. Each of these branches will be examined with respect
to the nonsubstantive question of whether the courts may hear and de-
cide the merits of the minimum commission controversy.
II. CONGREssIoNAL EXEMPTION
The question presented for consideration .under this heading is
whether the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 mandates the minimum
commission rate structure. The effect of a determination that Congres-
sional intent was to preserve such a minimum rate structure would be
twofold. First, the SEC would be powerless to change the commission
rate structure; and second, a Congressional mandate adopting a mini-
10. Kestenbaum, Primary Jurisdiction to Decide Antitrust Jurisdiction: A Practical
Approach to the Allocation of Functions, 55 GEo. L.J. 812 (1967) [hereinafter cited as
Kestenbaum].
11. A.B.A. Antitrust Sec. Rep., Antitrust Developments Vol. 1955-1968 190 (1968).
12. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 389 U.S. 954 (1967) (Warren, C.J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari). See Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 358 n.12
(1963).
I 13. McGovern, supra note 7, at 10. See, e.g., the discussion of Far East Conference v.
United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952) and Federal Maritime Board v. Isbrandtsen, 356 U.S.
481 (1958) in McGovern, Types of Questions Over Which Administrative Agencies Do
Not Have. Primary Jurisdiction, A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEc. REP., Vol. 13 57-61 (1958) [herein-
after cited as Types].
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mum commission rate structure would, by implication, immunize that
structure from antitrust attack.
A. Forum for Decision
A preliminary issue raised by the Congressional exemption theory
deals with the proper forum for decision. It should be made clear at
the outset that this preliminary issue is not an exercise in the applica-
tion of the primary jurisdiction doctrine. This fact, which cannot be
taken for granted, is evidenced by a recent article14 in which the author
purported to find in the Jewel Tea case'" "factors relevant to allocation
of the function of resolving a claim of antitrust immunity."' 6 He con-
cluded that the "Jewel Tea criteria for allocating the decision of anti-
trust immunity are, the court's ability to proceed on its own, and the
need, utility, and availability of agency decision.'
It is submitted that the author' 8 of that article has both misinter-
preted Mr. Justice White's opinion in Jewel Tea and misapplied the
limited doctrine of primary jurisdiction. The Supreme Court in Jewel
Tea carefully distinguished the union's primary jurisdiction contention
from the argument of antitrust exemption.'" The enunciation of criteria
relied upon and quoted by Mr. Kestenbaum appears only in the Court's
discussion of primary jurisdiction.2 0 The Court had no difficulty decid-
ing the antitrust exemption question without any need for enlightenment
from the National Labor Relations Board, which is the relevant agency.
The Board was never even mentioned in that part of the opinion in
which the Court decided the antitrust exemption issue by "accommodat-
ing the coverage of the Sherman Act to the policy of the labor laws.""
There is, in fact, no such theory of "primary jurisdiction to decide
antitrust jurisdiction." Primary jurisdiction is a judicial doctrine.2
There can be no judicial doctrines without decided cases.23 The value
of Mr. Kestenbaum's article on this issue lies in his analysis of the
factors supporting judicial decision of antitrust immunity questions,
14. Kestenbaum, supra note 10.
15. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676 (1965).
16. Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 815.
17. Id. at 816. In support of this conclusion, Mr. Kestenbaum cites Jewel Tea, 381
U.S. at 684-88.
18. The author, Mr. Kestenbaum, is a member of the Department of Justice.
19. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 684 (1965).
20. Id at 684-88. See Note, Labor-Antitrust: Collective Bargaining and the Competi-
tive Economy, 20 STAN. L. REv. 684, 708-10 (1968).
21. Local 189, Amalgamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 684, 689 (1965).
22. Types, supra note 13, at 57.
23. See Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 820, quoted infra at 6-7; McGovern, supra
note 13, at 60-61. But cf. Atchison, Topeka & S.F. Ry. Co. v. Aircoach Transport Ass'n,
253 F.2d 877, 886 (D.C. Cir. 1958) ; Trienens, Types of Questions Subject to the "Primary
Jurisdiction" of Administrative Agencies, A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. REP., Vol. 13, 42, 53
(1958) [hereinafter cited as Trienens].
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and not in the theory of primary jurisdiction to decide antitrust juris-
diction.24
Genuine primary jurisdiction "requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the special
competence of an administrative body . . .,"I The Congressional anti-
trust exemption issue requires for its resolution the statutory interpre-
tation of the Securities Exchange Act. The court could conclude either
that "the antitrust claim [is] barred because the antitrust laws have
been entirely displaced by" the regulatory scheme, or that "the anti-
trust claim is unaffected by the regulatory statute or by anything which
might have been done or might be done under it."126 Statutory construc-
tion and interpretation are traditional judicial functions, and, in fact,
the Supreme Court has reached both of the above conclusions 27 without
the aid of the particular agencies involved in the various regulatory
schemes.28
The judicial power to determine the reach of antitrust law by means
of statutory construction of the relevant regulatory scheme is consistent
with the concept of true primary jurisdiction. Reference to the agency
is made only after a judicial determination that either administrative
expertise or the need for uniformity compels the result.29
In addition, an agency's "expertise, real or ex officio, can be said
to be limited to administrative questions and not to extend to determin-
ing the ultimate reach of its authority, particularly when impinging on
the courts' antitrust jurisdiction."30 "[A] [statutory] grant of [agency]
power implies a limit . . ." to be determined by the courts through the
process of defining statutory purpose in such a way as "to make all the
prescribed procedures workable. "3' This proposition is particularly well-
expressed by Mr. Kestenbaum, who states:
It is surely significant, however, that [no case calling for refer-
ence to a regulatory agency of issues of antitrust jurisdiction
hinging upon interpretation of regulatory statutes] ... has yet
appeared before the Supreme Court. The uniform decisions are
a silent tribute to the force of the arguments favoring the
courts' retention of the decisive role by retention of jurisdic-
tion. On the statutory issue of antitrust jurisdiction or immu-
nity, the probability of enlightenment from an agency opinion
24. See text accompanying notes 28-32 infra.
25. United States v. Western Pacific, 3S2 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
26. Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 818.
27. E.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963)
(exclusive agency jurisdiction); United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334
(1959) (antitrust jurisdiction sustained).
28. Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 818-19.
29. Id. at 819. See also Ailes, Some Procedural Problems of Primary Jurisdiction,
A.B.A. ANTITRUST SEC. REP. Vol. 13, 82 (1958) [hereinafter cited as Ailes].
30. Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 819.
31. Jaffe, Primary Jurisdiction, 77 HEARV. L. Rzv. 1037, 1041 (1964).
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is usually not high enough to warrant the burden of an admin-
istrative proceeding; any agency interest can ordinarily be
adequately expressed by means of amicus presentations in
court.32
In spite of these considerations, and the apparent irrelevance of
any SEC decision on the issue to an antitrust court, the principal par-
ticipants to the hearings have each included in their filings to the SEC
extensive analyses of the Securities Exchange Act with regard to the
possibility of Congressional exemption of the minimum commission
structure from antitrust law.8" Nothing appears to be lost by presenting
the issue to the SEC since the same arguments can be made to an anti-
trust court regardless of the SEC's decision. In fact, the exchanges and
individual members of the securities industry have much to gain if they
can successfully persuade the Commission that it has no power to alter
the minimum rate structure.8 4 Additionally, one should be aware of the
compromising effect of the Justice Department's recently articulated
policy of working more closely with administrative agencies in reaching
what it considers to be the correct results under both regulatory stan-
dards and antitrust law. 8 If the dispute never reaches a court, any SEC
decision would be determinative.
B. Preliminary Generalities
The analytical road to Congressional exemption is strewn with
"general propositions [that] do not decide concrete cases. ' 36 The trig-
gering device is the fact that "[t]he Securities Exchange Act contains
no express exemption from the antitrust laws . . . [therefore] any re-
pealer of the antitrust laws must be discerned as a matter of implica-
tion. . . .,8 Implied exemption language is inevitably followed, "as the
night the day,"'38 with the statement that "repeals by implication are
not favored."3
32. Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 820.
33. Compare Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 15-42 with Statement of the
Amex 41-69 and In the Matter of Commission Rate Structure of Registered National
Securities Exchanges, File No. 4-144, Memorandum on Behalf of New York Stock Ex-
change 5-16 (1968) [hereinafter cited as NYSE Legal Brief].
34. See note 2, supra.
35. Turner, The Scope of Antitrust and Other Economic Regulatory Policies, 82
HARv. L. REv. 1207, 1238 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Turner]. The Justice Department
appears to have worked more closely, and more successfully, with the SEC than with
other administrative agencies: jurisdictional conflicts between the two have been avoided.
See Bicks, Antitrust and the New York Stock Exchange, 21 Bus. LAW. 129, 157-58 (1965)
[hereinafter Cited as Bicks].
36. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting), cited in
Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 820.
37. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
38. Hamlet, Act I, Scene III.
39. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963), and cases
cited therein; McGovern, supra note 7, at 10. See JAMsx, JUDICIAL CONTROL Or ADmIN-
isTRArirV ACTION 142 (1965).
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On the other hand, the Securities Exchange Act is one of a number
of Congressional regulatory measures which subject the securities in-
dustry to some degree of administrative supervision and control. Such
regulation can manifest a Congressional preference for control over
competition, for it has been said "that the antitrust laws can have only
limited application to industries regulated by specific statutes." ° How-
ever, "[t]here is nothing novel about applying the antitrust laws to an
industry which is otherwise subject to governmental regulation or con-
trol." 1 In sum, "immunity will not be implied except when the Court
thinks it ought to be." 2
Other generalities, also useless as tools of analysis but noted here to
make the listing more complete, are expressed in terms of burden of
proof rules. The Justice Department contends that the antitrust laws are
applicable unless the securities industry can justify a departure from
traditional treatment.48 The industry, in turn, notes the longevity of the
minimum commission rate structure44 and asserts that in view of the
uncertain, potentially disastrous and irrevocable impact of a competitive
rate structure, the present system should be maintained until the Justice
Department proves all fears groundless.45
These general propositions neither substitute for, nor aid analysis
of, the Securities Exchange Act.48 They are detailed above in order to
illustrate the contradictions implicit among them and to emphasize the
inherent weakness of any court decision relying upon any of them as a
ground for decision. The appropriate judicial treatment appears to have
been made in Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,47 where Mr. Justice
Goldberg recognized the inapplicability of these general rules before he
began his antitrust exemption analysis, and thus eliminated any possible
impact that they may have had upon his subsequent reasoning. The
judicial inclination to rely upon labels rather than critical analysis must
be guarded against,4 particularly when the labels have been applied in
the varying contexts of diverse regulatory schemes. Since judicial ac-
commodation of the antitrust laws and the Securities Exchange Act
40. Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. FPC, 193 F.2d 230, 234 (D.C. Cir. 1951),
quoted in McGovern, supra note 7, at 10.
41. Nerenberg, Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to the Securities Field, 16 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 131, 132 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Nerenberg].
42. Kestenbaum, supra note 10, at 820.
43. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 42.
44. NYSE Legal Brief 14, quoting Kaplan v. Lehman Brothers, 250 F. Supp. 562
(N.D. Il. 1966). See Antitrust, supra note 7, at 231: "Of all the factors supporting exemp-
tion, the fact that the minimum commission rule has been in existence for 173 (now 178)
years probably is the most influential. Yet the wire service rule struck down in Silver
was more than half as old." Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 147.
45. NYSE Economic Brief 6-9.
46. Cf. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 389 U.S. 954, 955 (1967).
47. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
48. See Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937) (Cardozo, J., cautioning
against "the tyranny of labels").
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involves complex policy considerations, the mechanical application of
generalities is particularly inappropriate.
C. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange
The framework for analysis is expressed in Silver v. New York
Stock Exchange,4 9 the only Supreme Court case to hold a stock exchange
liable for violating the antitrust laws.50 The federal district court had
granted summary judgment for the plaintiff on the theory that stock
exchanges were subject to unlimited antitrust liability and that the
NYSE's action was a concerted refusal to deal which was per se un-
lawful." The appellate court reversed, holding the NYSE exempt from
antitrust attack when acting within its general scope of self-regulatory
authority under the Securities Exchange Act. 2 The Supreme Court
avoided the serious deficiencies inherent in each of the positions taken
below5" by adopting a more flexible approach to antitrust exemption
" 'which reconciles the operation of both statutory schemes,' i.e., the
antitrust laws and the Securities Exchange Act."'54
The Silver Court stated that the issue was to what "extent the
federal antitrust laws apply to securities exchanges" when the ex-
changes act "pursuant to rules . . . adopted under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934." 55 "[T]he Silver decision on the basic issue is
clear: the NYSE is liable under antitrust laws even though it is acting
pursuant to rules adopted under the machinery of the 1934 Act."5
However, the Court did acknowledge some situations in which the anti-
trust laws might not apply. For instance, "[t]he Court recognized that
concerted action by the exchange and its members, which limits com-
petition in a way that would otherwise violate the antitrust laws, might
be justified as falling within the scope and purposes of the Securities
Exchange Act, in particular within the 'federally mandated duty' of
exchange self-regulation."5 ' The Silver analysis is focused in these terms:
49. 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
50. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 217. Cf. Chicago Board of Trade v. United States,
246 U.S. 231 (1918); Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd,
371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967), cert den., 389 U.S. 954 (1967); See also United States v.
Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 631 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Gamco, Inc. v. Providence Fruit & Produce
Bldg., 194 F.2d 484 (1st Cir. 1952); American Fed'n of Tobacco Growers v. Neal, 183
F.2d 869 (4th Cir. 1950); United States v. Tarpon Springs Sponge Exch., 142 F.2d 125
(5th Cir. 1944).
51. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 196 F. Supp. 209 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
52. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 302 F.2d 714 (2d Cir. 1962).
53. Unlimited antitrust liability would hamper effective Exchange self-regulation;
complete antitrust exemption would leave the Exchange free "to engage in almost any
practices without fear of antitrust reprisals." Note, 10 Wm. & MARY L. REV. 136, 155
(1968).
54. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 15.
55. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 342-43 (1963).
56. Note, The Application of Antitrust Laws to the Securities Industry, 10 Wm. &
Mny L. REV. 136, 154 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Application].
57. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 15-16.
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Antitrust "[r]epeal is to be regarded as implied only if necessary to
make the Securities Exchange Act work, and even then only to the
minimum extent necessary. This is the guiding principle to reconciliation
of the two statutory schemes."58
The particular NYSE action in Silver, failure to give any notice or
to give an opportunity for a hearing on charges of violating an exchange
rule, was seen by the Supreme Court clearly contrary to the purposes
of the Securities Exchange Act, and so obviously outside the scope of
the exchange's self-regulatory powers under the act, that the situation
did not even approach one in which a justification for the acts might
be considered. Simply stated, antitrust liability was clear.5" "By thus
making antitrust liability rest on concepts of fair play instead of on
reconciliation of antitrust and securities statutes, the Court in effect side-
stepped the issue of interpreting the statutes."60
The issue of antitrust exemption for NYSE minimum commission
rate structures requires the interpretive analysis that the Silver Court
was able to avoid. The role of the Silver case in this context has been
stated in the following terms:
Antitrust now probes beyond particular NYSE enforcement or
disciplining moves to question the legality of the complex of
rules that comprise and buttress the Exchange's basic rate struc-
ture. Involved here are legal issues passed on only obliquely
by Silver, and policy questions that run deep in terms of the
NYSE's future role.01
D. Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Statutory construction generally begins with the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934.2 Of primary concern is section 19(b) of the Act:
The Commission is further authorized if . . . [it] determines
that . . . changes [in the Exchange's rules] are necessary or
appropriate for the protection of investors or to insure fair
dealing in securities traded in upon such exchange to insure fair
administration of such exchange, by rules or regulations or by
order to alter or supplement the rules . . . in respect of such
matters as . . . (9) the fixing of reasonable rates of commis-
sion . . . and (13) similar matters. 3
58. Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
59. Id. at 365. Application, supra note 56, at 155.
60. Application, supra note 56, at 155; Bicks, supra note 35, at 130, Nerenberg, supra
note 41, at 137-38; see Asch, The Antitrust Laws and the Regulated Securities Market, 11
ANTITRUST BULL. 209, 223 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Asch].
61. Bicks, supra note 35, at 145.
62. The Securities Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(aa)
et seq. (1967), is mainly concerned with the distribution of new issues of stock. See Bicks,
supra note 35, at 131.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78s(b) (1962). Sections 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3) (1964), and
6(d), 15 U.S.C. § 78f(d) (1950) are also relevant and are discussed infra.
ANTITRUST
The powers conferred on the Commission by section 19(b) must
be interpreted within the more general principle articulated in section
6(d) that the rules of an exchange be "just and adequate to insure fair
dealing and to protect investors." Section 19(b) appears to be the means
of achieving this insurance and protection. 4
The relevant statutory language quoted above does not explicitly
refer to the minimum commission rate structure, much less expressly
exempt that structure from the antitrust sphere. For Judge Medina in
United States v. Morgan,6 that was enough to defeat the exemption
theory.
It must be borne in mind that this whole statutory scheme
was worked out with the greatest care by members of the Con-
gress thoroughly aware of antitrust problems, often in close
contact and cooperation with those who were later to administer
the intricate phases of this well articulated and comprehensive
plan of regulation of the securities business, and in possession
of the fruits of many prolonged and penetrating investigations.
They intended no exemption to the Sherman Act; and it is
hardly probable that they would inadvertently accomplish such
a result.6
Nevertheless, the statutory silence on the status of the minimum
commission rate structure, particularly in light of the durable nature
of the rate structure, 7 and the apparently clear conflict between it and
the Sherman Act, apart from Congressional or regulatory exemption, 8
renders questionable Judge Medina's characterization of the Securities
Exchange Act as "well articulated and comprehensive," at least in this
context. "[T]he act neither defines 'reasonable rates of commission'
nor specifies how they are to be 'fixed.' Nor are other pertinent
statutory standards-'just and adequate,' 'fair dealing,' 'necessary
or appropriate,' 'fixing [of rates] '-anywhere defined." 69 Absence
of exemption language and lack of adequate definitional standards
has made these sections ambiguous. In fact, even the suggestion "that
such a patently ambiguous and cryptic conferral of powers upon the
Commission was also intended to establish blanket antitrust immunity is
unreasonable. 7 0
This statutory ambiguity has enabled both the NYSE and the
64. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 22.
65. United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
66. Id. at 697. The Morgan court was not presented with the minimum commission
rate structure as a violation of the Sherman Act, but the exemption language applied
equally across the board. See Nerenberg, supra note 41 at 132-33; Antitrust, supra note 7
at 218.
67. See note 44, supra.
68. Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 149; Antitrust, supra note 7, at 218; Memorandum
of the Dep't of Justice 16; but cf. Board of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
69. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 218-19 & n.36.
70. Id. at 218.
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Justice Department to argue that nothing refutes their opposing positions
as to the exempt status of the minimum commission rate structure.
Neither, of course, admits that the statutory language is ambiguous. In
fact, both, surprisingly enough, find the Securities Exchange Act and its
legislative history clear and unambiguous-while reaching totally con-
tradictory conclusions. 1
The NYSE contends that "[t]he Congressional policy favoring
continuation of the Exchange's practice of fixing minimum commission
rates has been clearly expressed not only in the 1934 Act but also in
the legislative history preceding its enactment .. ..""7 In support of
this contention, the NYSE quotes section 19(b) of the act and con-
cludes that unless the Exchange sets commission rates, there would be
nothing for the SEC to "alter or supplement."73 However, does this
conclusion which appears to be quite valid, necessarily express a "clear"
Congressional policy favoring minimum commission rates? The statute
empowers the SEC to alter or supplement Exchange commission rules to
insure their reasonableness. Presumably, under this standard, an ex-
change would be free to adopt any one of a variety of differing commis-
sion rate structures 74-subject only to SEC scrutiny. Although no specific
rates or rate structures are imposed upon the exchanges to the express
exclusion of any others, the statute does not shield any particular level
or structure of rates from either the application of the reasonableness
standard by the Commission or from antitrust attack.
Also wide of the mark is the second NYSE statutory argument.
It defies both law and logic to suggest that despite the
language of Section 19(b) (9) Congress intended to leave it up
to the SEC or some other federal agency to determine whether
exchanges should be allowed to fix commissions or should be
required to permit their members to set them independently.
Where Congress intended to give the SEC the power to abolish
or eliminate specific exchange practices it made this intention
unmistakeably clear. . . .Section 19(b) ...confers no power
on the SEC to prevent the exchanges from fixing commission
rates or to abolish exchange rules which do so.75
One of the problems with this argument is that the issue is not who
71. Compare NYSE Legal Brief 5-16 with Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice
15-42.
72. NYSE Legal Brief 5.
73. Id. at 6. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
74. A number of rate structures have been discussed as a possible alternative to the
present minimum system. The Justice Department suggests a maximum rate structure in
combination with competitive rates above a specified level of transaction size. Memoran-
dum of the Dep't of Justice 187. Another possibility is a minimum-maximum range of
rates. Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 149. A minimum mark-up over costs has also been
proposed. Crossland & Sehr, The Gods of the Marketplace: An Examination oj the Regu-
lation of the Securities Business, 48 B.U.L. REV. 515, 546 (1968) [hereinafter cited as
Crossland & Sehr].
75. NYSE Legal Brief 7.
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sets exchange commission rates, but whether the rate structure set by
the exchange is reasonable. The Exchange does not contend that it
has the power to establish commission rate structures for itself. Instead,
the NYSE is simply arguing that the statute clearly sets a limit of rea-
sonableness upon exchange commission rates, and that the SEC is in-
structed to enforce that limit.
A second problem with the above argument is that the Exchange's
reference to the explicitness of the Securities Exchange Act in other
contexts has put them into a position where they are feeling the bite of
their own two-edged sword. This follows from a comparison of the Ex-
change's earlier characterization of the Act as explicit with the general
proposition that Congressional exemption provisions are traditionally
explicitly indicated76 and here the Act is silent.
Another problem with the position taken by the NYSE is their
assumption that the continuous use of minimum commission rates from
1792 to the present in some way insulates that rate structure from
being abolished or eliminated by the SEC, particularly since Congress
did not specifically give the Commission the power to prevent the ex-
changes from fixing commission rates. 7 While Congress certainly did
not contemplate the elimination of all commission rates, it did in terms
require the SEC to "alter or supplement" those which were found to
be unreasonable. Presumably, if a particular rate structure were de-
termined to be unreasonable, the SEC, through corrective action, could
effect the substitution of a reasonable commission rate structure since
there is no clear-cut distinction between "abolish or eliminate" and
"alter or supplement." In fact, even a minor alteration might be enough
to eliminate the adverse consequences of an unreasonable commission
structure, and perhaps even the form of the exchange's structure.
Furthermore, the reasonableness standard used by Congress implies
continuing agency review since a previously existing rate level or struc-
ture, determined to be reasonable and approved in the past may "become
unreasonable as conditions change . . . .[Therefore] the logical inter-
pretation is that the SEC should have... power to deal with an exchange
rule retroactively." '78 Thus, Congressional recognition of the existence
of the minimum commission structure in 1934, which, when standing by
itself, is a neutral fact,79 ought not to prevent the SEC from carrying
out its responsibilities under section 19(b) (9) of the Securities Exchange
76. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 37-42.
77. Viewed in the light most favorable to the NYSE, this conclusion finds scant
support for the following reason:
Notwithstanding that the criticized practices [minimum commissions and limited
membership] existed in some form prior to the enactment of the Securities Ex-
change Act, Congress gave no clue as to whether it intended merely to recognize
the existence of the fixed commission schedules and attendant practices, or whether
it authorized such schedules for antitrust purposes.
Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 150.
78. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 217.
79. Id. at 234. See Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 146 n.71.
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Act by applying the reasonableness standard specified therein to Ex-
change commission rate rules. A contrary interpretation would render
that section nugatory: "reasonableness" would be frozen to 1934 condi-
tions.
In any event, the scope of SEC power is not necessarily the only
determinative factor on the issue of Congressional antitrust exemption
for the minimum commission rate structure."s The antitrust laws are
themselves vehicles for economic control which can work alongside of
and complement regulatory schemes.81 As such, antitrust standards have
been constantly applied to members of regulated industries.8 2 Conse-
quently, lack of SEC jurisdiction to eliminate minimum commissions
bears a doubtful relationship to the scope of antitrust in the courts. In
fact, if the NYSE position that the SEC has no jurisdiction over Ex-
change commission rate structures is accepted, the posture of the case
would be analagous to Silver:83
The absence of Commission jurisdiction, besides defining
the limits of the inquiry, contributes to its solution. There is
nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs the
antitrust function of insuring that an exchange will not in some
cases apply to its rules so as to do injury to competition which
cannot be justified as furthering legitimate self-regulative ends.
... [T]he antitrust laws are peculiarly appropriate as a check
upon anticompetitive acts of exchanges . ... 84
Thus, in the context of Silver, the stronger Exchange position would
appear to be one which emphasized, rather than pared, the SEC's power
over commission rate structures.8 5
The final NYSE statutory argument is based upon section 3(a) (3)
of the Securities Exchange Act, the section which defines a member of
a national securities exchange in these terms:
The term "member" when used with respect to an ex-
change means any person who is permitted either to effect
transactions on the exchange without the services of another
person acting as broker, or to make use of the facilities of an ex-
change for transactions thereon without payment of a commis-
sion or fee or with the payment of a commission or fee which is
less than that charged the general public, and includes any firm
80. But see Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 371 F.2d 409 (7th Cir. 1967) (alternative
holding).
81. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359-60 (1963). See
Stokes, A Few Irreverent Comments About Antitrust, Agency Regulation, and Primary
Jurisdiction, 33 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 529, 532-37 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Stokes].
82. E.g., Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
83. Id. at 358.
84. Id. at 360.
85. See text accompanying note 12, supra; Statement of the Amex 61-69.
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transacting a business as broker or dealer of which a member is
a partner, and any partner of any such firm. 6
On the basis of the foregoing language, the NYSE makes the fol-
lowing argument:
These provisions obviously contemplate the fixing by exchanges
of a uniform minimum rate of commission to be charged the
general public, since in the absence of such a uniform minimum
rate there would be no yardstick with which to determine
whether the commission or fee charged to members is 'less than'
that charged the public."'
The primary difficulty with this contention is the premise that "to read
into a definition a positive Congressional intent to impliedly repeal the
antitrust laws would be to establish statutory construction beyond per-
missible bounds.""" More specifically, section 3(a) (3) would still satis-
factorily define an exchange member even if a competitive rate structure
would eliminate commission differentials between members and the gen-
eral public."'
E. Legislative History
Numerous factors, collectively referred to as "legislative history,"
can often aid in the task of statutory interpretation when the language
of the statute itself is inconclusive or ambiguousY0 The end sought is
the determination of legislative intent and purpose when more than one
Congressional policy is possible in the statutory context. "To this end
the court may properly consider not only the language of the statute
but also general public knowledge about the evil sought to be remedied,
prior law, accompanying legislation, enacted statements of purpose,
formal public pronouncements, and internal legislative history.""1 Thus,
we turn to such ancillary materials in an effort to resolve the issue
of Congressional exemption of the minimum commission rate structure
from the antitrust laws.
"Before the securities laws were enacted, the stock exchanges were
86. Section 3(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(3) (1964).
87. NYSE Legal Brief 7. See Statement of the Amex 43.
88. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 31.
89. Id. at 30-31. But see Statement of the Amex 43: "If members were free to
negotiate commissions to be charged to the public there might be no difference between
such rates and those charged to other members, and the definition would be meaningless."
The AMEX, unlike the Justice Department, ignores the total definitive language set out
in section 3(a)(3).
90. Whether statutory language is ever clear enough on its face to justify the nonuse
of legislative history as an aid in construction is a matter of some dispute. See H.M. HART
& A. SACHS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF
LAW 1267-68 (tent. ed. 1958) [hereinafter cited as HART & SACKS].
91. Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HAav. L. REv. 1065, 1077
(1969), citing HART & SACKS, supra note 90, at 1413-16.
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viewed by the courts, Congress and the industry as private clubs, and
as such were generally exempt from any antitrust liability. '9 2 "Con-
gressional concern over the assumed lack of federal control led in the
years 1912-1914 to the introduction of eight resolutions to investigate
and nine bills to regulate the stock exchanges and to a formal investiga-
tion by the Pujo Committee."9 The Committee concluded that it was
doubtful whether federal regulatory power extended to exchange activity
and thus advised no Congressional action "in reference to the exchange's
rule regulating commissions" except to recommend that the exchange be
protected "against a kind of competition between members that would
lower the service and threaten the responsibility of members."94
As exchanges became a more and more important element in our
Nation's economic and financial system, however, the private-
club analogy became increasingly inapposite and the ungov-
erned self-regulation became more and more obviously inade-
quate, with acceleratingly grave consequences. This impotency
ultimately led to the enactment of the 1934 Act. 5
The "fierce controversy" surrounding the enactment of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act as well as "the great evils of manipulation and specu-
lation" diverted Congressional attention from generally considering the
"subsidiary antitrust aspects in its hearings, reports, and resulting leg-
islation."96 In addition, it is safe to say that the minimum commission
rate structure, rarely criticized as an element of abuse, was hardly a
hot issue and received scant attention 9 7
The Congressional draft bills, forerunners of present section 19(b)
(9), gave the Commission the power to "fix or prescribe the method of
fixing uniform rates of commission."98 Mr. Samuel Untermeyer, a New
92. Application, supra note 56, at 140, citing Jennings, Self-Regulation In the Secu-
rities Industry: The Role of the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CON-
TEMP. PROB. 663, 667-69 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Jennings]; Antitrust, supra note
7, at 223. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 351 (1963).
93. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 223, citing Westwood & Howard, Self-Government in
the Securities Business, 17 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 518, 523 (1952) [footnote omitted].
94. Report of the Committee Appointed Pursuant to House Resolutions 429 and
504 to Investigate the Concentration of Control of Money and Credit, H.R. REP. No.
1593, 62d Cong., 3d Sess. 115 (1913). Cf. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 35: "The
1934 Act is based on the proposition that Congress could reach, under the commerce
clause, all aspects of exchange operation."
95. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 351 (1963). The Court also
referred to a House Committee Report, H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1934),
which blamed "inertia, pressure of vested interests, lack of organization" for the "repetition
in the summer of 1933 of the blindness and abuses of 1929." The report concluded that
"private leadership seeking to make changes must be given Government help and pro-
tection."
96. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 224.
97. Id.; Comment, 45 N.C. L. REv. 301, 304 (1966); Memorandum of the Dep't of
Justice 24. But see NYSE Legal Brief 9: "[M]inimum commission rates [were] repeatedly
referred to . . . [and] specifically mentioned in the House and Senate debates."
98. H.R. 7852, S. 2693, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
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York attorney who had served as counsel for the Pujo Committee, had
objected to the "uniform rates" language and had recommended striking
"uniform," arguing that to do so would give the SEC power to fix all
commission rates and remove the "burden on commerce" allegedly re-
sulting from the exchanges charging "all that the traffic will bear."99
Despite this testimony, however, the bill reported retained the "uniform
rates" provision.100 Nevertheless, without further explanation,'' the bill
was enacted in its present form 0 2 with "reasonable" substituted for the
original "uniform."
The lack of explanation for the deletion of the "uniform rates"
wording has produced a number of conflicting opinions. One commenta-
tor concludes that "[b]y relating this change [from "uniform" to "rea-
sonable"] to the original committee objections, one could justifiably infer
that Congress had no intention of empowering the exchanges to establish
commission rates free from antitrust liability."' 3 But another observer
doubts the validity of this conclusion:
[T]he legislative history is of no help in determining whether
the statute also impliedly grants rate-fixing power to the ex-
changes themselves or immunizes their rate-fixing from antitrust
liability. Applying a post hoc, ergo propter hoc analysis to the
Untermeyer objections and the subsequent, unexplained change
from "uniform" to "reasonable" before the act's passage, one
could justifiably infer that the exchanges were not intended to
have such immunity. Yet this inference seems too frail a foun-
dation for a conclusion of such practical magnitude.' 4
The search for Congressional intent is further confused by the
peculiar relationship of the SEC as regulator and supervisor of the
securities industry.
The Commission's relationship to the business it regulates is
fundamentally different from that of other Federal indepen-
dent administrative agencies; it is not only regulator, but also
supervisor of "self" regulators. There are, no doubt, many other
instances in which the policy of entrusting a degree of social
control to "private" groups has been adopted, but securities
99. Hearings on Stock Exchange Practices Before the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. at 7705 (1933-1934); Antitrust, supra note 7, at
224; Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 26; NYSE Legal Brief 9-10.
100. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 224. But see Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 26:
"'Uniform' . . . replaced by 'reasonable' . . . apparently is result of .. . testimony given
by Mr. Untermeyer." See also NYSE Legal Brief 10, drawing conclusions from Mr. Unter-
meyer's testimony.
101. Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 150-31; Antitrust, supra note 7, at 223.
102. See text accompanying note 63, supra.
103. Note, Monopolies-Immunity From Antitrust Liability-Minimum Commission
Rates of Stock Exchanges, 19 CAsE W. REs. L. Rav. 167, 170 n.21 (1967).
104. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 225.
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regulation is unique in featuring self-regulation as an essential
and officially sanctioned part of the regulatory pattern.0 5
While this system of SEC overseeing of exchange self-regulation is seen
as desirable for a number of reasons, 1°8 its deference to the actions of the
regulated industry in the first instance would seem to argue against im-
plied antitrust exemption. Mr. Cary, former chairman of the SEC, be-
lieves that "SEC supervision need not, and should not, stifle initiative
for self-regulation by the exchanges."'1 7 But even an antitrust court can
appreciate that a certain amount of lebensraum is necessary to enable an
exchange "to carry out the mandate of the Securities Exchange Act."' 08
"[P]articular instances of exchange self-regulation which fall within the
scope and purposes of the Securities Exchange Act may be regarded as
justified in answer to the assertion of an antitrust claim."' 0 9
Moreover, despite the apparent pervasiveness of the regulatory
scheme and the SEC's general oversight, it has been observed that there
still remain "significant gaps" in the regulations resulting from the lack
of uniformity in the application of the regulations and from the SEC's
lack of authority over the means of applying various rules." 0 Thus, the
regulatory controls established by Congress over the securities industry
may not be sufficiently thorough to warrant antitrust exemption."' The
Justice Department points out that the SEC has no control over entry
and exit, no control to require unprofitable service in the public interest,
no control over mergers, and no power to limit the profits of exchange
members in contrast to other regulatory schemes where these controls
would make antitrust exemption more appropriate." 2 In addition, the
SEC has no jurisdiction over an exchange member's breach of an ex-
change rule"' and it is unable to consider individual grievances." 4
Conversely, the regulatory machinery established by Congress re-
105. SEC, REP. OF THE SPECIAL STUDY OF SECURITIES MARKETS pt. IV, at 501 (1963)
[hereinafter cited as SPECIAL STUDY].
106. Id., pt. II, at 328-29.
107. Application, supra note 56, at 143, quoting Cary, Self-Regulation in the Securities
Industry, 49 A.B.A.J. 244, 246 (1963).
108. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
109. Id. at 361.
110. Application, supra note 56, at 141, citing Asch, supra note 60 at 214; Bicks,
supra note 35, at 146; Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 138.
111. AREEDA, ANTITRUST ANALYSIS 56 (1967). But see Hale & Hale, Competition
or Control VI: Application of Antitrust Laws to Regulated Industries, 111 U. PA. L. Rzv.
46, 57 (1962): "Under the mushroom doctrine, however, it is safe to assume that expan-
sion will shortly take place; intervention will soon reach out to fill the gaps in the
existing structure of controls; hence it is foolish to confuse matters by applying antitrust
legislation in the interim." The Hales' analysis is criticized in Antitrust, supra note 7, at
240 n.203.
112. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 37-42.
113. Jennings, supra note 92, at 671-72.
114. Application, supra note 56, at 142, citing Silver v. New York Stock Exchange,
373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); Bicks, supra note 35, at 137. Cf. Sterling, Stockbrokers Going
Public: Antitrust Aspects of Exchange Rules, 13 U.C.L.A. L. Rv. 563, 574 & n.58 (1966)
[hereinafter cited as Sterling].
ANTITRUST
lies heavily upon exchange self-regulation to achieve the purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act, and it has been suggested that extensive im-
munity from the antitrust laws is a necessary concomitant since the
threat of antitrust attack would have the effect of making the exchanges
timorous in implementing their self-regulatory responsibility." 5
The legislative history of section 19(b) (9) and the mechanics of
securities regulation established by the Exchange Act permit inferences
which can logically support both conclusions. In this instance, then, it
is of little value in determining Congressional intent.
F. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., and a Suggestion
The most recent judicial consideration of the legal status of the
minimum commission rate structure was Kaplan v. Lehman Bros.,""
which involved a detailed analysis of Silver v. New York Stock Ex-
change."a A close reading of the Kaplan decision compels a reexamina-
tion of Silver's guiding principle of "reconciliation of the two statutory
schemes."'"" In Kaplan, the plaintiffs claimed that the action was in-
stituted on behalf of five mutual funds and their shareholders." 9 The
five named defendant firms, brokers for the funds, were nominal defen-
dants only; the actual defendants were the NYSE and four Exchange
members.' 20 In other words, Kaplan was an action by mutual fund
shareholders against the NYSE and Exchange members who managed
the funds.' 2 '
The Kaplan cause of action was based on the theory that the mini-
mum commission rates charged the funds pursuant to NYSE rules
"amounts to a combination and conspiracy in restraint of trade in viola-
tion of Section (1) of the Sherman Anti-trust Act... .,1122 Consistent with
the allegation of per se illegality, the case was decided on motion for
summary judgment entered for the defendants. 28 Indeed, if Kaplan were
read as holding only that NYSE commission rates were not amenable
to antitrust attack on a per se theory, the case would be of little in-
terest, 24 for such has been the law since 1918.125
115. Sterling, supra note 114, at 573.
116. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. I1. 1966), aff'd, 371 F.2d 409
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. den., 389 U.S. 954 (1967).
117. Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).
118. Id. at 357.
119. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. II1. 1966).
120. Id. at 562-63.
121. Application, supra note 56, at 157.
122. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562, 563 (N.D. Ill. 1966).
123. Id. at 566.
124. See Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963); Chicago Bd. of Trade
v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918).
125. The Justice Department prefers to read Kaplan narrowly in this way. See
Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 32-33 & n.9. While there are substantial qualitative
differences between the NYSE minimum rate structure and the temporary overnight
freeze of prices in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), the
"rule of reason" applied equally to determine the justification for the practice in each.
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. Nevertheless, the district court in Kaplan purported to find ad-
ditional support for its decision in Silver, even though Silver expressly
refused to decide the case in which Exchange activity is subject to ad-
ministrative review.2 6 "Where the action in question in Silver-the
means of applying an exchange rule-was beyond the scope of SEC
review and thus not subject to any regulation [except by means of anti-
trust], the rule in question in Kaplan was clearly within the SEC's power
to review127 and thus was subject to regulation.' '1 28 Thus, an alternative
holding in Kaplan is that an antitrust action cannot be maintained when
an Exchange rule is subject to SEC regulatory power. 29
Kaplan is criticized not so much for the decision reached but for
the "blunderbuss" analysis used. 30 Both the district court and the
Seventh Circuit failed to recognize that Silver provides the starting point
for analysis rather than the end result. Silver emphasized that each of
the Congressional schemes, antitrust and regulatory, is to be construed
"to make the Exchange Act work." Perhaps, in recognition of the un-
fortunate ambiguity in the Exchange Act with regard to the legal status
of minimum commission rates, the Silver mandate should be more
specifically stated in this context to require an analysis and result which
would make the NYSE work. Thus, the mere presence of a clause in the
Exchange Act would be but a factor in the process of accommodating the
two legal systems and not the stopping point as in Kaplan.' It is
recognized that accomodation itself is a rather euphemistic term which
tends to conceal the fact that, while one sphere of law is being applied,
another legal scheme is being rejected, despite the fact that there is a
reasonable basis for the rejected scheme's application. 3 2 Ideally, the
accommodation will advance the purpose of the law chosen without frus-
trating or seriously impairing the purpose of the law that is rejected. 33
Strictly as a matter of antitrust law, the existence of so impor-
tant and pervasive a structure of commission rates ought to rest
126. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562, 566 (ND. Ill. 1966), quoting Silver
v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 360 (1963).
127. But see Comment, 45 N.C. L. REV. 301, 307 (1966): "The right to have such
rates reviewed by the SEC is in reality illusory since that review is of the reasonableness
of the commissions and presupposes a fixed minimum." It is submitted that this statement
presupposes more than can be assumed without analysis. See Antitrust, supra note 7, at
218-19; Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 29.
128. Application, supra note 56, at 158.
129. Application, supra note 56, at 158; Crossland & Sehr, supra note 74, at 553;
Comment, supra note 97, at 303. This is the holding relied upon by the NYSE. NYSE
Legal Brief 14-16.
130. Kaplan v. Lehman Bros., 389 U.S. 954, 957 (Warren, C.J., dissenting from the
denial of certiorari).
131. It is fair to note that the principal participants in the SEC hearings have each
recognized the full import of the Silver analysis by presenting extensive economic data
and conclusions on the role of the minimum commission rate structure in the context
of exchange functions. See note 6, supra.
132. See D. CAVERS, Tni CuoicE-oF-LAW PROCESS 120 (1965).
133. Id. at 151.
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on a sounder legal foundation. If there is sufficient economic
justification to insist upon a minimum rate structure, then clas-
sification by way of a limited antitrust exemption by statute
would be appropriate. Otherwise, in the absence of further reg-
ulatory control by the Commission, it would appear that the
present rate structure may be susceptible to antitrust enforce-
ment. l34
III. JURISDICTIONAL ASPECTS OF SECURITIES REGULATION IN THE
MINIMUM COMMISSION CONTEXT
A. Preclusive SEC Jurisdiction
At this point, the writer indulges in two assumptions, each of which
is subject to dispute, but necessary for further development of the anal-
ysis under this heading. The first is that Congress has not immunized
the minimum commission rate structure by mandating it in the Securities
Exchange Act. Second, that section 19(b) (9) of the Act gives the SEC
authority to examine the minimum commission structure and alter it
should it decide to do so. The issue presented is whether a grant of ad-
judicatory power over the commission rate structure to the SEC com-
pletely deprives the courts of subject matter jurisdiction, particularly
in view of the absence of statutory provision for judicial review. This is
the question expressly left open in Silver, but subsequently decided in
favor of SEC preclusive jurisdiction in Kaplan. As previously noted,13 5
the Kaplan decision on this issue was little better than conclusory, an
approach, it is further assumed, that does not preclude a more extensive
analysis.
Once again, it is important to distinguish the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction from the present discussion of preclusive jurisdiction.3 6 The
primary jurisdiction doctrine, properly applied, "must be limited to its
legitimate function of accommodating both court and agency where con-
current, original jurisdictional exists, rather than applied carte blanche
in situations ranging from review of agency decisions to questions of
exemptions and exclusive agency jurisdiction.' 1 37 The difference between
primary jurisdiction and preclusive jurisdiction is crucial, because when
the two are confused, 3" there is the danger that the application of pri-
134. Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 151.
135. See text related to notes 126-31 supra.
136. At p. 735-37 supra, primary jurisdiction was distinguished from the issue of the
proper forum to decide implied Congressional exemption.
137. Stokes, supra note 81, at 532. The term "preclusive jurisdiction" is taken from
Antitrust, supra note 7, at 214, and is used in place of "exclusive agency jurisdiction"
primarily to avoid possible confusion with another doctrine of "exclusive jurisdiction,"
apparently a term of art in the administrative context in L. JAFFE, JuDIcIAL CONTROL OF
ADmINISTRATIVE AcTIoN 709 (1965), as meaning the "ownership of the case-its parties,
its facts, and its questions" which "changes hands when it crosses the boundary between"
court and agency. Under this version of the exclusive jurisdiction doctrine, neither court
nor agency can act while "the case" is before the other.
138. See, e.g., the hybrid term "exclusive primary jurisdiction" in Local 189, Amal-
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mary jurisdiction criteria will lead a court to dismiss a case; an action
proper only in the context of preclusive jurisdiction and wholly inap-
propriate under the primary jurisdiction doctrine. 139 At best, such an
unwarranted dismissal results in expense, inconvenience, and delay. At
worst, it can leave the plaintiff remediless: The plaintiff might be told,
in effect, to exhaust his administrative remedies when it may be im-
possible for him to present his case to the relevant agency, the statute
of limitations may run while matters are before the agency, or the
agency may be unable to provide the relief sought. 4 '
The issue of preclusive SEC jurisdiction is grounded in the purpose
of the Securities Exchange Act and can be presented as a question of
whether it is necessary for the "effective discharge" of its duties for the
SEC to have sole control of exchange rate setting.' 41
It is undoubtedly an implied aspect of the statutory purpose
that a specialized administrative tribunal has been created to
deal with problems in a certain area; statutes setting up agen-
cies may be assumed to focus the solution of the problem in
terms of the development of special competence. 42
But we have previously seen that the SEC differs, perhaps significantly in
this context, from agencies created by other regulatory systems. In ad-
dition, the SEC has maintained regulatory control over the securities
industry for approximately thirty-five years without the exercise of its
section 19(b)(9) powers and without "comprehensive and consistent
public articulation ... of the principles or criteria to be applied in inter-
preting the [reasonable rate of commission] standard . .. . 43
The Special Study of the securities markets undertaken by the SEC
reported three conclusions regarding the general supervision of stock ex-
changes: there is a need to insure effective self-regulation; there is a
need to prevent the inherent anti-competitiveness of exchange self-regula-
tion from exceeding its justification; and to the extent the exchanges
function as public utilities, the need and reasons for public supervision
are much the same as for any other utility. 44 "These are usually summed
gamated Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 684 (1964). Potential difficulty
from this confusion was avoided since the Court held the doctrine inapplicable.
139. General Am. Tank Car. Co. v. El Dorado Terminal Corp., 308 U.S. 422
(1940); Ailes, supra note 29, at 87 and n.16; L. JAFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIS-
TRATIVE ACTION 138 (1965).
140. See Montana Dakota Utils. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246
(1951); Seatrain Lines, Inc. v. Pennsylvania R.R., 207 F.2d 255 (3rd Cir. 1953); Con-
visser, Primary Jurisdiction: The Rule and Its Rationalizations, 65 YALE L.J. 315, 332-35
(1956) [hereinafter cited as Convisser].
141. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 229.
142. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 124 (1965).
143. Special Study pt. II, at 343, quoted in Antitrust, supra note 7, at 228-29. There
are recurring references to the factors of fair return, efficiency, prudence, and quality,
but their significance in fixing commission rates has never been spelled out.
144. Special Study pt. II, at 328-29; Bicks, supra note 35, at 156-57; Jennings, supra
note 92, at 680; Nerenberg, supra note 41, at 133-34; Antitrust, suPra note 7, at 232;
Application, supra note 56, at 143.
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up in the proposition that due to the many subtle aspects and intricate
interworkings of the securities industry, the SEC is best able to control
all aspects of regulation."' 45 The anti-trust laws, seen as a complementary
means of industry regulation, ought to be applied to the securities in-
dustry only by the SEC, because "only the SEC has the necessary ex-
perience to balance the conflicting demands of the antitrust and securities
laws and to keep the interrelationships in the securities laws in equilib-
rium." ' While it is disputed whether the SEC can in fact order rule
changes under section 19(b) (9) on antitrust grounds,'47 a 1941 decision
of the SEC struck down a NYSE rule which would have restricted the
ability of NYSE members to deal in multiple-listed securities because
that rule "would operate as an unreasonable and unjustified restraint
upon interstate commerce ....",4 Even conceding this SEC power, how-
ever, does not resolve the issue of sole agency responsibility to implement
the antitrust laws in the securities field. It is submitted that judicial re-
view of antitrust application would not only have the advantage of SEC
expertise but also correct improper use of antitrust doctrine. Moreover,
the SEC "has itself helped to determine the form of the industry and
is understandably hostile to potential disturbers of the status quo."' 49
Professor Jaffe notes in this context that "[t]he French insight, tout
comprendre c'est tout pardonner, is not without a certain relevance." 5
Thus, the close relationship between agency and industry may have
created a bias which necessitates judicial review; a disinterested forum
free to consider the merits.' This position is somewhat weakened when
it is observed that the SEC has never before scrutinized or expressly
approved the minimum commission rate structure, but the fact that it
has not acted could be taken as implied approval under the Exchange
Act and antitrust standards.'52 In addition, it should be noted that anti-
trust principles have traditionally been enforced by both the government
and private parties, and that preclusive SEC jurisdiction necessarily
means the elimination of private suits since section 19(b) powers are
initiated by the SEC alone. Finally, SEC expertise and its responsibility
under section 19(b) are "not the enforcement of antitrust laws but
145. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 232. Sterling, supra note 114, at 572.
146. Sterling, supra note 114, at 572. Compare NYSE Legal Brief 2-4 with SEC Re-
lease No. 8239, supra note 1 and Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 18.
147. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 232-33.
148. Rules of the New York Stock Exchange, 10 S.E.C. 270, 287 (1941), quoted in
Sterling, supra note 114, at 572. See also, In the Matter of Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
19 S.E.C. 424, 443 (1945) (dictum).
149. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 142 (1965).
150. Id., at 141-42.
151. One hesitates to suggest a recent political parallel for this position in which one
of the Republican candidate's campaign assertions was that since he shared no responsibility
for the war in Viet Nam, he was in a position to re-evaluate the merits of continued
American involvement and make appropriate changes; whereas, it was said, the party in
power was already committed to a continuation of the conflict. Query the length of time
which will commit the present administration and narrow the options available to it.
152. See Sterling, supra note 114, at 572; Antitrust, supra note 7, at 235.
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rather the protection of investors, 'to insure fair dealing in securities...
and fair administration' ""' of the stock exchanges.
The goal of securities regulation, as stated in the Securities Ex-
change Act, is to provide for regulation and control of such [exchange]
transactions and of practices and matters related thereto . , *."' The
public interest in the regulation and control of stock exchanges is
significantly different from government intervention in other areas of
the national economy. Elsewhere, regulation promotes efficiency by the
limitation of competition where economies of scale and natural monopoly
conditions make competition uneconomical.
The stock exchange, however, has the opportunity of being a
more competitive market than most because it displays the
characteristics-at least outwardly-of a competitive market:
(1) Its "products" are homogeneous within its classification
because every stock of an issuer in a particular class is identi-
cal with every other stock of that class; (2) There are large
numbers of sellers and buyers because ownership of American
corporations tends to be widely dispersed; (3) There exists a
wide network of firms specializing in the buying and selling of
securities both as agents and for their own accounts; and (4)
In the case of "listed" shares at least, selling prices recently
experienced by buyers and sellers are widely varied."'a
Efficient stock exchange operation is dependent upon the convergence of
as many demand and supply factors as possible.
The more of these market factors that are present the better
the chance the marketplace has of properly evaluating the
worth that society places on the endeavors of a particular
enterprise. Anything which would inhibit this free flow of
'goods' or funds is detrimental to the workings of the mar-
ket . . .1e
Consequently, effective stock exchange regulation has as its end the
encouragement of competition within the confines of the auction market
and the elimination of factors which would tend to dilute the competitive
process.
Since it is certain that the minimum commission rate structure is
at least to some extent responsible for a lessening of volume on the
floor of the NYSE and is a contributing factor in the fragmentation
of the securities industry by diverting funds to regional exchanges, the
over-the-counter markets, and to the so-called third and even fourth
markets for listed stocks, the rate structure is to that extent an anti-
competitive influence . 5 7 In addition, it is generally recognized that the
153. Sterling, supra note 114, at 572. See Turner, supra note 35, at 1237.
154. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) quoted in Crossland & Sehr, supra note 74, at 516.
155. Crossland & Sehr, supra note 74, at 517 (footnotes omitted).
156. Id.
157. FORTUNE, April, 1969, at 81-82, 167; Crossland & Sehr, supra note 74, at 533-48;
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minimum commission rate structure has motivated those with the power
to do so to develop "intricate means of circumventing the letter of the
law by arrangements among brokers to achieve the ends of reduced
rates;" most conspicuously the recently limited "give-up" system.15
For these reasons, it would appear on the surface that the commission
rate structure is precisely the kind of exchange practice which Congress
intended for the SEC to regulate and control. However, this conclusion
need not necessarily follow, and in fact, may be both undesirable and
detrimental for the maintenance of an efficient stock exchange operation.
Previous to the Securities Exchange Act, Congress had enacted regu-
latory legislation-the Sherman Act-which is perhaps better suited for
the control of commission rate abuse than is the SEC. "There is no
antithesis between antitrust policy, intelligently conceived, and the
achievement of efficient performance under conditions of natural
monopoly; efficiency is (or should be) the paramount goal of anti-
trust."'1 9 The economics of the securities industry are such that any
regulation of commissions other than a competitive system or an
arbitrary commission schedule (or a combination of the two'10)
may be impossible for practical reasons which are beyond the con-
trol of the SEC.' The number of firms to be regulated,' 62 as well
as the "complexity of the factors that go into devising a rate which
represents a fair return-costs of each kind of service, the possible
market impact of a rate, appropriate profit level and base-raise
considerable doubt whether the SEC is competent to handle ratesetting
problems."' 0 3 The fact that the SEC is not alone in this disability is
illustrated by the conclusion reached after a recent economic analysis of
the effectiveness of regulation in natural monopoly:
[T]his study has convinced me that in fact public utility reg-
ulation is probably not a useful exertion of governmental
powers; that its benefits cannot be shown to outweigh its
costs; and that even in markets where efficiency dictates mon-
opoly, we might do better to allow natural economic forces to
determine business conduct and performance subject only to
the constraints of antitrust policy. 4
Application, supra note 56, at 159-60; Antitrust, supra note 7, at 213, 237; Mundheim,
Forward to Symposium on the Securities and Exchange Commission, 29 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROB. 647, 650 (1964).
158. Application, supra note 56, at 160-61; Antitrust, supra note 7, at 235; "elaborate
evasionary practices;" Special Study pt. II, at 309; "complex system of arrangements ...
not seem[ing] to be a desirable answer to a pricing problem in any industry;" Memo-
randum of the Dep't of Justice 71-88; Crossland & Sehr, supra note 74, at 551-52.
159. Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 617-18
(1969), citing C. KAYSEN & D. TURNER, ANTITRUST PoLicY 45 (1959). See also Turner,
supra note 35, at 1237.
160. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 187.
161. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 234-35.
162. There are 1,366 member firms on the NYSE alone.
163. Antitrust, supra note 7, .at 235.
164. Posner, supra note 159, at 549.
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His analysis of the harmful effects of regulation led Professor Posner to
recommend "resolute refusal to extend regulation to new industries" as
well as the "relaxation of [present] regulatory controls as a matter of
administrative discretion." 1 5
If the foregoing assessment of the difficulties of rate regulation in
the securities industry is accurate, the policies of the Securities Ex-
change Act can best be furthered by the absence of regulation and
exchange rules in the commission area and the institution of a com-
petitive rate structure instead. Perhaps, the only "reasonable rates of
commission" can be freely competitive rates. Preclusive SEC jurisdic-
tion would be unnecessary to insure the effective operation of a com-
petitive rate structure; the antitrust laws enforced in the courts by both
the Justice Department and private parties have traditionally accom-
plished this end.
The case law in the preclusive jurisdiction context has been de-
scribed as being in a state of chaos.
Some regulated industries are subject to antitrust legislation;
others are not. Some courts hold business subject to interven-
tionist enactments to be free from rules prohibiting restraints
of trade; others do not. New cases are decided without refer-
ence to old precedents and the courts in general have been un-
able to explain coherently the conclusions they have reached."
The most important characteristic of a reasoned decision would
be a "detailed analysis of the regulatory statutes and administrative ac-
tion thereunder.' 67 Earlier, it was concluded that the purposes of the
Securities Exchange Act would be better achieved if competitive com-
mission rates replaced the present minimum rate structure and that
preclusive SEC jurisdiction was unnecessary to realize that objective.
The case law does not alter this conclusion.
The issue which remains to be discussed concerns itself with the
vitality of an antitrust cause of action after the enactment of a reg-
ulatory scheme. In Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil
Co.,108 a case often noted as the first primary jurisdiction decision,16
(but really concerned with the problem of supersession of antitrust law
by regulatory law) 1 71 the Court held that judicial remedies were de-
stroyed by the enactment of a regulatory scheme when a shipper al-
leged that rates were unreasonable. The Court decided that only the
relevant agency, the Interstate Commerce Commission, could determine
whether rates were reasonable, because if courts and juries could revise
165. Id: at 640. Ci. Turner, supra note 35, at 1232, 1243-44.
166. Hale & Hale, Competition or Control 1: The Chaos in the Cases, 106 U. PA. L.
REV. 641, 681 (1958).
167. Id. at 682.
168. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
169. E.g., L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL or ADMINISTRATIVE AcTioN 125 (1965).
170. E.g., Types, supra note 13, at 62.
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a rate schedule there would be no uniformity, and this "would render
the enforcement of the act impossible." '71 Since these issues are reg-
ularly decided by administrative agencies and generally thought to be
beyond the competence of the courts,'72 a number of cases have dis-
missed antitrust actions grounded on particular rate practices because
the agency had exclusive jurisdiction to make the appropriate deter-
minations. 7
Even thorough regulation, however, does not necessarily imply free-
dom from antitrust enforcement. Railroads, for example, are subject
to pervasive I.C.C. supervision, including control over entry, rates,
service, financing, pooling of earnings, division of traffic, mergers, and
consolidations. 74 Nevertheless, and in striking contrast to the cases
noted above, a long line of Supreme Court decisions has applied the
Sherman Act to the railroad industry. 75 The securities industry, less
completely controlled by a scheme of regulation which relies heavily
upon self-regulation, would appear to be subject to antitrust policy in
addition to general SEC regulation, particularly in the context of the
commission rate structure which would ordinarily constitute price fix-
ing, which is per se illegal. 7
In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 7 the Supreme
Court held that a bank merger, previously approved by the Comptroller
of the Currency, violated the Clayton Act. The Court rejected the con-
tention that "the Bank Merger Act, by directing the banking agencies
to consider competitive factors before approving mergers, immunizes
approved mergers from challenge under the federal antitrust laws."' 78
Although the Comptroller was required to consider effect upon
competition in passing upon appellees' merger application, he
was not required to give this factor any particular weight;
... and there is no specific provision for judicial review of his
decision. . . . Moreover, bank regulation is in most respects
less complete than public utility regulation, to which interstate
171. Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 441 (1907).
See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE AcTION 125 (1965).
172. Trienens, supra note 23, at 44.
173. E.g., Far East Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); United States
Nay. Co. v. Cunard S.S. Co., 284 U.S. 474 (1932); Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 260
U.S. 156 (1922).
174. Hale & Hale, supra note 166, at 643-44.
175. Id. at 645 & n.27; United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass'n, 166 U.S. 290
(1877). Georgia v. Pennsylvania R.R., 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
176. United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-22, 224 n.59 (1940).
But see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918). Silver, however,
took Sherman Act violations out of the per se category in the securities industry. Kaplan
v. Lehman Bros., 250 F. Supp. 562 (N.D. I1. 1966).
177. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). See also United States v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 376
U.S. 665 (1964).
178. 374 U.S. 321, 350 (1963). The Court noted at 374 U.S. 351 n.26: "This con-
tention was abandoned on appeal. We consider it, nevertheless, because it touches the
proper relations of the judicial and administrative spheres."
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rail and air carriers, among others, are subject. Rate regula-
tion in the banking industry is limited and largely indirect,
... ; banks are under no duty not to discriminate in their ser-
vices; . .. banks may do business . . . where they please. The
fact that the banking agencies maintain a close surveillance of
the industry ... does not make federal banking regulation all-
pervasive . 179
Application of the relevant factors as expressed in Philadelphia
National Bank "leads to the conclusion that the preclusive jurisdiction
doctrine will not bar an antitrust attack on the NYSE's commission
rules."'180 This conclusion is based upon several reasons. First, as noted
above,' while the SEC sometimes considers anticompetitive effects, it
is neither "required" to do so nor is it required "to give this factor any
particular weight."' 82 Second, provision for judicial review of an SEC
"order" is made in section 25 of the Securities Exchange Act, but un-
der section 19(b) the SEC can act by "rules or regulations or by order."
Thus, there may be a gap in the judicial review of SEC action.' 3 Third,
rate regulation in the securities industry is "limited and largely indi-
rect." 84 Fourth, NYSE member firms are under a positive duty to "dis-
criminate in their services." A fifth reason is that:
[B]rokers are [not] required to maintain unprofitable facil-
ities in the public interest or to provide services for all custom-
ers or all types of transactions. Indeed, they are not required
by law to serve anyone. We have seen in recent months how
brokerage firms refuse certain types of unprofitable orders and
close down unprofitable branch offices. 8 5
Securities regulation, then, is "almost identical" to the bank regulation
described in Philadelphia National Bank; to the extent it differs, ap
plication of the criteria quoted above presents a stronger case for
rejection of the preclusive jurisdiction rule."' 80
B. Primary Jurisdiction
Primary Jurisdiction is a judicial doctrine "designed to avoid du-
plication and conflict between different governmental entities dealing
with the same subject matter.' '81 7 A cogent definition of the doctrine is
stated in United States v. Western Pacific R.R.:1 8
179. United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 at 351-52 (1963).
180. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 216.
181. See text accompanying note 148 supra.
182. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 216.
183. Id., noting the "The Commission recently took the position that its determination
would be subject to judicial review . ...
184. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 216.
185. Memorandum of the Dep't of Justice 40-41.
186. Antitrust, supra note 7, at 216.
187. Mitchell, Primary Jurisdiction: What It Is and What It Is Not, A.BA. AxN-
TRUST SEC. REP., Vol. 13, 26 (1958).
188. 352 U.S. 59, 63-64 (1956).
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The doctrine of primary jurisdiction ... is concerned with
promoting proper relationships between the courts and admin-
istrative agencies charged with particular regulatory duties.
"Primary jurisdiction" . . . [is] applied where a claim is
originally cognizable in the courts, and comes into play when-
ever enforcement of the claim requires the resolution of issues
which, under a regulatory scheme, have been placed within the
special competence of an administrative body; in such a case
the judicial process is suspended pending referral of such issues
to the administrative body for its views.
The distinguishing characteristic of primary jurisdiction relates
to the court's original jurisdiction to entertain the controversy. 189 It is
for this reason that the "problems engendered by exemption from the
antitrust laws on the one hand and the grant of exclusive agency juris-
diction on the other cannot be solved, or even intelligently discussed,
within the matrix of what is now called primary jurisdiction."' 90
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction is thus quite limited in both
its scope and application. We start with the proposition that the anti-
trust court has properly obtained jurisdiction of the case before it
under the antitrust laws. ("Primary jurisdiction" plays no role in de-
termining antitrust jurisdiction. The doctrine is operative, if at all,
only when there is concurrent jurisdiction in court and agency. Confu-
sion on this issue, as noted previously,' has resulted in the mingling
of primary jurisdiction concepts with antitrust exemption, exclusive
agency jurisdiction, and exhaustion of administrative remedies; situa-
tions in which a case is not properly before the court at all. Dismissal,
appropriate when the court does not have jurisdiction, is inappropriate
in the primary jurisdiction context where the court by definition does
have jurisdiction.)
The legal process ordinarily assumes judicial decision when the
jurisdiction of the court is properly invoked. In rare instances, how-
ever, it may be necessary for a court to refer certain of the issues be-
fore it to an administrative agency for decision or fact-finding before
the court itself renders its judgment. The doctrine of primary jurisdic-
tion has been developed by the courts to aid in the determination of
when such agency reference is necessary and appropriate. In this con-
text, the question presented for discussion in this section is whether an
antitrust court, faced with the problem of the legality under the anti-
trust laws of the stock exchange minimum commission rate rules, should
refer any of the issues before it to the SEC for decision by that agency.
Properly applied, the primary jurisdiction doctrine will enable the
court "to evaluate whether the critical issues posed in the antitrust
189. Mitchell, supra note 187, at 29.
190. Stokes, supra note 81, at 551.
191. See text accompanying notes 136-40 supra.
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case actually fall within the policymaking competence of the regulatory
agency.'1 9
2
The development of the primary jurisdiction doctrine has isolated
two reasons for its application: uniformity and expertise. The earlier
cases stressed the need to funnel through the agencies questions where
the statutory policy was interpreted as requiring uniformity of admin-
istration, rates, or construction of tariffs.' The judicial forum was
seen as inappropriate in such instances since inherent in the process of
numerous suits is a diversity of results reached by different courts and
juries. A single administrative agency, repeatedly presented with sim-
ilar issues, was thought more likely to achieve consistency and thus
better able to further the legislative goal of uniformity.
The second rationale was developed by Mr. Justice Brandeis in
Great No. Ry. v. Merchants Elevator Co.:194
[T]he enquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in
technical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its de-
termination is left to the Commission. Moreover, that deter-
mination is reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting
evidence, for the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance
with many intricate facts of transportation is indispensable;
and such acquaintance is commonly to be found only in a body
of experts.
While these criteria accurately describe the reasons for the primary
jurisdiction doctrine, "they are much too sweeping to be helpful in
defining its application,"' 5 particularly in the realm of regulated in-
dustry where the need for a concise definition is crucial. "Taken liter-
ally, they would suggest that every case of any description arising in a
regulated industry should be referred to the appropriate regulatory
agency."'' 9 Professor Jaffe suggested that the doctrine be used "only
when a court finds itself faced with relevant considerations which it
genuinely feels it is not in a position to evaluate . . . . Surely it should
not be necessary in every individual application of a rate to undertake
an elaborate court hearing."' 97 The criteria for the application of the
doctrine have been recognized as properly grounded in Congressional
intent: "whether one or more of the critical issues before the Court
are the kind of issues that fall within the agency's regulatory compe-
tence and in the uniform solution of which the agency has a legitimate
192. Types, supra note 13, at 67.
193. Id. at 63; Convisser, supra note 140, at 324; Keogh v. Chicago & N.W. Ry. Co.,
260 U.S. 156 (1922); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Am. Tie Co., 234 U.S. 138 (1944);
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 125 (1965).
194. 259 U.S. 285, 291 (1922).
195. Types, supra note 13, at 63.
196. Id.; Convisser, supra note 140, at 329.
197. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL or ADimNsTRATinV ACTION 130 (1965).
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concern under the statutory scheme of control provided by Congress
for the industry."'198
Issues involving the reasonableness of rates and industry practices
have traditionally been among the types of questions subject to the
primary jurisdiction doctrine.' 9 The reason for this is twofold: first, in
many cases, Congressional intent that rates be uniform is clear; second,
rate regulation involves a detailed analysis of complex accounting, cost-
finding, rate comparison factors in the light of regulatory policy-an
analysis generally thought beyond the competence of courts but seen
as issues regularly decided by administrative agencies. 200 But even in
this area, reference to the agency is not automatic: "In every case the
question is whether the reasons for the existence of the doctrine are
present and whether the purposes it serves will be aided by its applica-
tion in the particular litigation. ' 2 0' 1
It is submitted that in an antitrust action challenging the fixed
minimum commission rate structure as a violation of the Sherman Act
there would be no occasion to apply the primary jurisdiction doctrine.
First, the uniformity rationale would be inapplicable. The suit would
challenge the structure of the rate system itself rather than the reason-
ableness of a particular rate. 2 On the other hand, structural uniformity
would be preserved if the court concluded that a competitive rate sys-
tem must be used. In addition, the present minimum structure does not
guarantee uniformity because (a) a firm is free to charge commissions
at any level above the minimum 0 3 and (b) the "give-up" system has
essentially been a competitive institution in which the broker retains
but a fraction of his "minimum commission." Thus, the present lack of
uniformity under the minimum rate structure militates against the use
of the uniformity criterion to refer the issue to the SEC.
SEC expertise, as a factor in determining primary jurisdiction in
the agency, deserves attention. The SEC is familiar with the intricate
problems and economics of the securities industry, and it is in the best
position to measure the impact of a competitive rate structure on the
industry. Realistically, SEC expertise can enlighten the court without
formal reference to that agency. The Commission has been conducting
a thorough investigation of the commission structure for over fifteen
198. Types, supra note 13, at 67; Convisser, supra note 140, at 336: "[S]ince it is
Congress that creates the administrative jurisdiction out of which the problem of con-
flicting jurisdictions originates, it is in congressional intent that the problem's solution
should be found."
199. E.g., Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 296 (1963);
United States v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59 (1956); Far East Conference v. United
States, 342 U.S. 570 (1952); Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S.
426 (1907). See Trienens, supra note 23, at 43-52.
200. Trienens, supra note 23, at 44. See also Turner, supra note 35, at 1235.
201. United States v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 64 (1956).
202. Cf. Convisser, supra note 140, at 325.
203. Almost all transactions take place at the minimum commission level, however.
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months; however, its determination can be made available to the court
only by way of amicus presentation. Once the SEC has in fact reached
a decision it would serve no purpose for the court to stay its hand pend-
ing reference of the same issues already decided by the agency. "The
court will have the benefit of the agency's investigation and analysis of
the facts ... ."o The additional insights possibly accruing from re-
ferral under the primary jurisdiction doctrine would have to be balanced
against the inconvenience and expense ancillary to its application, and
it is likely that the latter would outweigh the former.
IV. CONCLUSION
Court consideration of stock exchange practices has been rare. The
Supreme Court has yet to rule on the legality of the minimum commis-
sion rate structure, an exchange institution since 1792. The increasing
activity of institutional investors has served to highlight and empha-
size the inadequacy of adherence to minimum rates as a practical matter.
The tangle of evasionary devices, developed as alternatives, has initiated
SEC investigation and the possibility of a restructuring of exchange
commission rates. The likelihood of subsequent litigation makes it ap-
propriate to examine the jurisdictional aspects of court accommodation
of the antitrust laws to the securities industry.
The focal point of this article has been the extent to which a court
should be able to hear and decide the merits of the minimum commis-
sion controversy. The conclusion favors full judicial consideration of
the merits.
Congressional exemption of the minimum commission rate structure
from the antitrust laws cannot justifiably be inferred from the am-
biguous Securities Exchange Act. The emphasis upon self-regulation,
the residual role and limited power of the SEC, argues against both
implied statutory exemption and preclusive SEC jurisdiction. The rea-
sons for the application of the primary jurisdiction doctrine are not
present in this instance. In sum, nothing shields the stock exchange
minimum commission rates from judicial scrutiny.
204. Mitchell, supra note 187, at 37.
